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GHSA-3q28-qjrv-qr39 GHSA-4cm8-xpfv-jv6f GHSA-c442-97qw-j6c6 GHSA-mwv9-gp5h-frr4 GHSA-xg2q-62g2-cvcm
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‎advisories/github-reviewed/2026/03/GHSA-3q28-qjrv-qr39/GHSA-3q28-qjrv-qr39.json‎

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{
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"schema_version": "1.4.0",
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"id": "GHSA-3q28-qjrv-qr39",
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"modified": "2026-03-12T16:38:46Z",
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"published": "2026-03-12T16:38:46Z",
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"aliases": [
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"CVE-2026-32246"
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],
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"summary": "Tinyauth vulnerable to TOTP/2FA bypass via OIDC authorize endpoint",
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"details": "### Summary\n\nThe OIDC authorization endpoint allows users with a TOTP-pending session (password verified, TOTP not yet completed) to obtain authorization codes. An attacker who knows a user's password but not their TOTP secret can obtain valid OIDC tokens, completely bypassing the second factor.\n\n### Details\n\nWhen a user with TOTP enabled logs in at `POST /api/user/login`, the server creates a session with `TotpPending: true` and returns a session cookie. The context middleware (`internal/middleware/context_middleware.go:56-66`) correctly sets `TotpPending: true` and does not set `IsLoggedIn` for these sessions.\n\nHowever, the OIDC authorize handler (`internal/controller/oidc_controller.go:105-116`) only checks whether a user context exists via `utils.GetContext(c)`. It does not check `IsLoggedIn` or `TotpPending`. Since the context middleware populates a context for TOTP-pending sessions (with the username filled in), `GetContext` succeeds, and the handler proceeds to issue an authorization code at line 156 using the username from the incomplete session.\n\nFor comparison, the proxy controller (`internal/controller/proxy_controller.go:176-179`) correctly blocks TOTP-incomplete sessions by checking `IsBasicAuth && TotpEnabled` and setting `IsLoggedIn = false`. The OIDC authorize handler has no equivalent guard.\n\n`StoreCode` at `internal/service/oidc_service.go:305` saves the code with the victim's `sub` claim. The attacker then exchanges this code at `POST /api/oidc/token` for a valid access token and ID token.\n\n### PoC\n\nPrerequisites: a tinyauth instance with at least one OIDC client configured and a local user with TOTP enabled.\n\nStep 1 — Log in with password only (do not complete TOTP):\n\n```\ncurl -c cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/user/login \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d '{\"username\":\"totpuser\",\"password\":\"totp123\"}'\n```\n\nResponse: `{\"message\":\"TOTP required\",\"status\":200,\"totpPending\":true}`\n\nStep 2 — Request an OIDC authorization code using the TOTP-pending cookie:\n\n```\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/oidc/authorize \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d '{\"client_id\":\"my-client-id\",\"redirect_uri\":\"http://localhost:8080/callback\",\"response_type\":\"code\",\"scope\":\"openid\",\"state\":\"test\"}'\n```\n\nResponse: `{\"redirect_uri\":\"http://localhost:8080/callback?code=<AUTH_CODE>&state=test\",\"status\":200}`\n\nStep 3 — Exchange the code for tokens:\n\n```\ncurl -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/oidc/token \\\n -u \"my-client-id:my-client-secret\" \\\n -d \"grant_type=authorization_code&code=<AUTH_CODE>&redirect_uri=http://localhost:8080/callback\"\n```\n\nResponse contains `access_token`, `id_token`, and `refresh_token` for the victim user. TOTP was never submitted.\n\n### Impact\n\nComplete bypass of TOTP/MFA for any user account on any tinyauth instance that has OIDC clients configured. An attacker who has compromised a user's password (credential stuffing, phishing, database breach) can obtain SSO tokens for that user's identity without knowing the TOTP secret. This defeats the purpose of the second factor entirely. All downstream applications relying on tinyauth's OIDC provider for authentication are affected.",
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"severity": [
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{
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"type": "CVSS_V3",
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"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:N"
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}
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],
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"affected": [
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "Go",
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"name": "github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "0"
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},
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{
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"fixed": "1.0.1-20260311144920-9eb2d33064b7"
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}
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]
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"references": [
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth/security/advisories/GHSA-3q28-qjrv-qr39"
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},
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{
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"type": "PACKAGE",
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"url": "https://github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth"
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},
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth/releases/tag/v5.0.3"
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"cwe_ids": [
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"CWE-287"
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],
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"severity": "HIGH",
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"github_reviewed": true,
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"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-12T16:38:46Z",
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"nvd_published_at": null
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}
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}

‎advisories/github-reviewed/2026/03/GHSA-4cm8-xpfv-jv6f/GHSA-4cm8-xpfv-jv6f.json‎

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{
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"schema_version": "1.4.0",
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"id": "GHSA-4cm8-xpfv-jv6f",
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"modified": "2026-03-12T16:38:22Z",
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"published": "2026-03-12T16:38:22Z",
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"aliases": [],
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"summary": "ZeptoClaw: Email Sender Spoofing to bypass Header-Only From Allowlist Validation",
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"details": "### Summary\nThe email channel authorizes senders based on the parsed `From` header identity only. If upstream email authentication/enforcement is weak (for example, relaxed SPF/DKIM/DMARC handling), an attacker can spoof an allowlisted sender address and have the message treated as trusted input. \n\n### Details\nRelevant code paths:\n\n- `src/channels/email_channel.rs:311` extracts sender identity from parsed message headers:\n - `let from = parsed.from() ... a.address() ...`\n- `src/channels/email_channel.rs:328` authorizes using that `from` value:\n - `if !self.is_sender_allowed(&from) { ... }`\n- `src/channels/email_channel.rs:87` onward (`is_sender_allowed`) performs allowlist/domain matching against the same header-derived value.\n- There is no in-channel validation of sender authenticity indicators such as SPF/DKIM/DMARC results before allowlist trust decisions.\n\nResult:\n- Trust decision is based on a potentially spoofable header field unless mailbox/provider-side anti-spoofing controls are strong and enforced.\n\n### PoC\n1. Configure email channel with strict sender allowlist:\n - `channels.email.enabled = true`\n - `channels.email.allowed_senders = [\"ceo@example.com\"]`\n - `channels.email.deny_by_default = true`\n2. Ensure the monitored mailbox accepts or forwards a spoofed message (for testing, use a local SMTP path that does not enforce sender authentication strongly).\n3. Send an email to the monitored inbox with forged header identity:\n\n```bash\npython - <<'PY'\nimport smtplib\nfrom email.message import EmailMessage\n\nmsg = EmailMessage()\nmsg[\"From\"] = \"ceo@example.com\" # forged trusted sender\nmsg[\"To\"] = \"bot-inbox@example.net\"\nmsg[\"Subject\"] = \"forged control message\"\nmsg.set_content(\"FORGED EMAIL CONTENT\")\n\n# Example test SMTP endpoint\nwith smtplib.SMTP(\"127.0.0.1\", 25) as s:\n s.send_message(msg)\nPY\n```\n\n4. Wait for IMAP fetch/IDLE processing.\n5. Observe the message is accepted as allowlisted sender `ceo@example.com` and published as inbound channel input.\n\n### Impact\n- Vulnerability type: sender identity spoofing risk due to header-based authorization.\n- Affected deployments: those using email channel allowlists where upstream anti-spoof controls are weak, misconfigured, or bypassed.\n- Security effect:\n - Spoofed `From` headers may bypass logical sender allowlist.\n - Malicious content can enter trusted automation/agent flows as if sent by authorized identities.\n- Risk is reduced in environments with strict SPF/DKIM/DMARC enforcement and strong inbound mail hygiene, but not eliminated at application layer.\n\n### Patch Recommendation\nAdd a sender-authentication gate in `src/channels/email_channel.rs` immediately after parsing `from` (`src/channels/email_channel.rs:311`) and before allowlist enforcement (`src/channels/email_channel.rs:328`). The gate should require trusted SPF/DKIM/DMARC evidence with domain alignment (for example, `DMARC=pass`, or aligned SPF/DKIM pass) before `is_sender_allowed` is evaluated. For backward compatibility, add a configurable mode in `EmailConfig` (for example, `sender_verification_mode`), but recommend hardened settings in production: `dmarc_aligned`, exact-address allowlists, and `deny_by_default=true`.",
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"severity": [
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{
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"type": "CVSS_V3",
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"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N"
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}
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],
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"affected": [
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "crates.io",
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"name": "zeptoclaw"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "0"
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},
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{
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"fixed": "0.7.6"
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"last_known_affected_version_range": "<= 0.7.5"
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}
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}
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],
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"references": [
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/qhkm/zeptoclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-4cm8-xpfv-jv6f"
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},
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{
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"type": "PACKAGE",
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"url": "https://github.com/qhkm/zeptoclaw"
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},
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/qhkm/zeptoclaw/releases/tag/v0.7.6"
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"cwe_ids": [
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"CWE-306",
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"CWE-345"
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],
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"severity": "MODERATE",
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"github_reviewed": true,
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"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-12T16:38:22Z",
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"nvd_published_at": null
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}
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}

‎advisories/github-reviewed/2026/03/GHSA-c442-97qw-j6c6/GHSA-c442-97qw-j6c6.json‎

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{
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"schema_version": "1.4.0",
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"id": "GHSA-c442-97qw-j6c6",
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"modified": "2026-03-12T16:37:58Z",
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"published": "2026-03-12T16:37:58Z",
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"aliases": [
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"CVE-2026-32234"
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],
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"summary": "Parse Server has a SQL injection via query field name when using PostgreSQL",
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"details": "### Impact\n\nAn attacker with access to the master key can inject malicious SQL via crafted field names used in query constraints when Parse Server is configured with PostgreSQL as the database. The field name in a `$regex` query operator is passed to PostgreSQL using unparameterized string interpolation, allowing the attacker to manipulate the SQL query. While the master key controls what can be done through the Parse Server abstraction layer, this SQL injection bypasses Parse Server entirely and operates at the database level.\n\nThis vulnerability only affects Parse Server deployments using PostgreSQL.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe fix applies proper SQL identifier escaping to field names in the query handler and hardens query field name validation to reject malicious field names for all query types.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThere is no known workaround.\n\n### References\n\n- GitHub security advisory: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-c442-97qw-j6c6\n- Fix Parse Server 9: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/releases/tag/9.6.0-alpha.10\n- Fix Parse Server 8: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/releases/tag/8.6.36",
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"severity": [
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{
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"type": "CVSS_V4",
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"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N"
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}
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],
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"affected": [
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "npm",
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"name": "parse-server"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "9.0.0"
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},
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{
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"fixed": "9.6.0-alpha.10"
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}
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]
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}
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]
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},
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "npm",
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"name": "parse-server"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "0"
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},
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{
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"fixed": "8.6.36"
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}
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]
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"references": [
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-c442-97qw-j6c6"
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},
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{
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"type": "ADVISORY",
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"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32234"
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},
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{
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"type": "PACKAGE",
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"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server"
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},
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/releases/tag/8.6.36"
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},
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/releases/tag/9.6.0-alpha.10"
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"cwe_ids": [
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"CWE-89"
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],
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"severity": "MODERATE",
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"github_reviewed": true,
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"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-12T16:37:58Z",
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"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-11T20:16:18Z"
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}
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}

‎advisories/github-reviewed/2026/03/GHSA-mwv9-gp5h-frr4/GHSA-mwv9-gp5h-frr4.json‎

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{
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"schema_version": "1.4.0",
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"id": "GHSA-mwv9-gp5h-frr4",
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"modified": "2026-03-12T16:38:15Z",
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"published": "2026-03-12T16:38:15Z",
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"aliases": [],
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"summary": "Sveltejs devalue's `devalue.parse` and `devalue.unflatten` emit objects with `__proto__` own properties",
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"details": "In some circumstances, `devalue.parse` and `devalue.unflatten` could emit objects with `__proto__` own properties. This in and of itself is not a security vulnerability (and is possible with, for example, `JSON.parse` as well), but it can result in prototype injection if _downstream_ code handles it incorrectly:\n\n```ts\nconst result = devalue.parse(/* input creating an object with a __proto__ property */);\nconst target = {};\nObject.assign(target, result); // target's prototype is now polluted\n```",
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"severity": [
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{
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"type": "CVSS_V4",
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"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U"
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}
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],
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"affected": [
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "npm",
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"name": "devalue"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "0"
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},
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{
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"fixed": "5.6.4"
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"last_known_affected_version_range": "<= 5.6.3"
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}
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}
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],
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"references": [
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/sveltejs/devalue/security/advisories/GHSA-mwv9-gp5h-frr4"
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},
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{
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"type": "PACKAGE",
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"url": "https://github.com/sveltejs/devalue"
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},
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/sveltejs/devalue/releases/tag/v5.6.4"
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"cwe_ids": [
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"CWE-1321"
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],
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"severity": "LOW",
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"github_reviewed": true,
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"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-12T16:38:15Z",
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"nvd_published_at": null
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}
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}

‎advisories/github-reviewed/2026/03/GHSA-xg2q-62g2-cvcm/GHSA-xg2q-62g2-cvcm.json‎

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{
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"schema_version": "1.4.0",
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"id": "GHSA-xg2q-62g2-cvcm",
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"modified": "2026-03-12T16:38:42Z",
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"published": "2026-03-12T16:38:42Z",
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"aliases": [
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"CVE-2026-32245"
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],
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"summary": "Tinyauth's OIDC authorization codes are not bound to client on token exchange",
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"details": "### Summary\n\nThe OIDC token endpoint does not verify that the client exchanging an authorization code is the same client the code was issued to. A malicious OIDC client operator can exchange another client's authorization code using their own client credentials, obtaining tokens for users who never authorized their application. This violates RFC 6749 Section 4.1.3.\n\n### Details\n\nWhen an authorization code is created, `StoreCode` at `internal/service/oidc_service.go:305-322` correctly stores the `ClientID` alongside the code hash in the database (line 316).\n\nDuring token exchange at `internal/controller/oidc_controller.go:267-309`, the handler retrieves the code entry at line 268 and validates the `redirect_uri` at line 291, but never compares `entry.ClientID` against the requesting client's ID (`creds.ClientID`). The code proceeds directly to `GenerateAccessToken` at line 299.\n\nThe developers clearly intended this check to exist, the refresh token flow at `internal/service/oidc_service.go:508-510` has the exact guard: `if entry.ClientID != reqClientId { return TokenResponse{}, ErrInvalidClient }`. It was simply omitted from the authorization code grant.\n\nThe `entry.ClientID` field is stored in the database but never read during authorization code exchange.\n\n### PoC\n\nPrerequisites: a tinyauth instance with two OIDC clients configured (Client A and Client B). Both clients must have at least one overlapping redirect URI, or the attacker must be able to intercept the authorization code from Client A's redirect (via referrer leak, browser history, log access, etc.).\n\nStep 1 — Log in as a normal user:\n\n```\ncurl -c cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/user/login \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d '{\"username\":\"admin\",\"password\":\"admin123\"}'\n```\n\nStep 2 — Authorize with Client A:\n\n```\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/oidc/authorize \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d '{\"client_id\":\"client-a-id\",\"redirect_uri\":\"http://localhost:8080/callback\",\"response_type\":\"code\",\"scope\":\"openid\",\"state\":\"test\"}'\n```\n\nExtract the `code` parameter from the `redirect_uri` in the response.\n\nStep 3 — Exchange Client A's code using Client B's credentials:\n\n```\ncurl -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/oidc/token \\\n -u \"client-b-id:client-b-secret\" \\\n -d \"grant_type=authorization_code&code=<CODE_FROM_STEP_2>&redirect_uri=http://localhost:8080/callback\"\n```\n\nThe server returns a valid `access_token`, `id_token`, and `refresh_token`. Client B has obtained tokens for a user who only authorized Client A.\n\n### Impact\n\nA malicious OIDC relying party operator who can intercept or observe an authorization code issued to a different client can exchange it for tokens under their own client identity. This enables user impersonation across OIDC clients on the same tinyauth instance. The attack requires a multi-client deployment and a way to obtain the victim client's authorization code (which is passed as a URL query parameter and can leak through referrer headers, browser history, or server logs). Single-client deployments are not affected.",
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"severity": [
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{
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"type": "CVSS_V3",
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"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:N"
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}
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],
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"affected": [
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "Go",
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"name": "github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "0"
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},
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{
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"fixed": "1.0.1-20260311144920-9eb2d33064b7"
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}
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]
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"references": [
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth/security/advisories/GHSA-xg2q-62g2-cvcm"
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},
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth/commit/b2a1bfb1f532e87f205fa3afa3fc9f148c53ab89"
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},
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{
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"type": "PACKAGE",
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"url": "https://github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth"
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},
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth/releases/tag/v5.0.3"
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"cwe_ids": [
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"CWE-863"
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],
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"severity": "MODERATE",
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"github_reviewed": true,
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"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-12T16:38:42Z",
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"nvd_published_at": null
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}
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}

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